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1 This significant book is  the main outcome of an international research program on
“Public  Sphere,  Value-Conflict,  and  Social  Experience:  A  Pragmatist  Approach,”
conducted in 2008-11 by Ramón del Castillo. Within this framework, the editors of the
book organized, in 2010, an international conference on the philosophy of Richard J.
Bernstein. The conference became the highlight of the program as far as the American
philosopher not only represents a key-figure of the American philosophical tradition,
but he also embodies the core intuition of the program. His philosophical style is a
paradigm, and a source of inspiration, for contemporary philosophical reflections on
ethical, social, and political “confines” issues. 
2 The book is  a  collection of  fifteen essays by international  scholars accompanied by
separate replies from Bernstein. It is subdivided into four sections; each one is focused
on a specific aspect of his work or a confrontation with a particular author. The topics
are  chosen  among  the  plurilateral  and  multifaceted  reflections  of  Bernstein  on
democracy.  The  first  section  addresses  the  relationship  between  “Bernstein  and
American Pragmatism,” particularly focusing on his association with Richard Rorty.
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Robert Westbrook tells an affectionate tale of these two philosophers (“A Tale of Two
Dicks”). His close examination of their biographical and intellectual background arrives
at  pointing  out  shared  convictions  and  significant  disagreements.  In  particular,
considering Rorty’s and Bernstein’s presidential addresses, respectively given in 1979
and 1988 to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, Westbrook
argues that the essential components of their views can be gathered under the label of
a “pragmatic ethos” (6). They both subscribed anti-foundationalism,  as a way to deny
that knowledge can be founded upon fix basements and that we have a special faculty
to intuit these foundations; fallibilism as a constitutive element of inquiry that enables
us to correct and enhance our “beliefs and thesis” through a continuous process of
interpretation and criticism. Then, sociality, as a constitutive aspect of the self as well as
a necessary requisite for scientific inquiries; and the pragmatist attention toward the
radical contingency and pluralism that mark our lives and universe. As to the persistent
differences that ‘make the difference’  between Bernstein’s and Rorty’s perspectives,
Westbrook includes the aversion of  Bernstein for  Rorty’s  insistent  critiques against
representationalist view of knowledge and traditional epistemology. This was only the
pars  destruens of  the  task  indicated  by  Dewey  to  reconstruct  philosophy.  But  in
Westbrook’s view, the words of Bernstein hide both a more profound agreement and a
more profound disagreement with Rorty’s claim for the abandonment of the concept of
“experience.” Bernstein not only believed that Rorty had to move on to a constructive
phase,  but he was also worried by his friend’s too unkind treatment of the “realist
intuitions”  (7).  In  fact,  Rorty  was  deeply  concerned  by  the  possible  revive  of
foundationalist  claims  through pragmatism concepts.  Bernstein  and others  worried
that Rorty fell easy prey to the accusation of “bad relativism” by pressing pragmatism
in the  direction of  a  radical  linguistic  constructionism,  or  “linguistic  idealism” (8).
Relying upon Davidson, James, and Dewey’s conceptions of the relationship between
causal  pressures  from  non-human  world  and  beliefs,  Westbrook  considers  Rorty’s
position  as  neither  naïve  nor  at  odds  with  Bernstein’s  criticism  of  the  misleading
confusion  between  brute  constraint and  epistemic  authority.  The  more  profound
disagreement was more general than the measure in which independent-world plays a
constraint  role  in  the  formation  of  beliefs.  Rorty’s  insistence  on  epistemological
concerns, in Bernstein and Westbrook’s reading, went hand in hand with “a misleading
conception  of  human  being-in-the-world  as  ubiquitously  a  knowledge-affair”  (9).
Bernstein claimed for an “enriched pragmatism” in the line of James, Dewey, and Mead,
thus  sharing  the  classic  pragmatists’  insistence  on  the  priority  of  conduct  upon
knowing. 
3 The second main disagreement focused by Westbrook between Rorty and Bernstein
regards  their  views  of  politics.  As  known,  Rorty’s  liberalism  was  at  odds  with
Bernstein’s  democratic  stance.  In  his  review  of  Contingency,  Irony,  and  Solidarity,
Bernstein even went  so  far  to  assimilate  Rorty’s  irony to  Mussolini’s cynism.  Quite
apart  from  inexact  exaggerations,  as  he  explains  in  his  reply  to  Westbrook,  anti-
authoritarianism  and  creative  private  self-fulfillment  were  fundamental  aspects  of
Rorty’s  thinking.  Bernstein  instead  confirms  the  description  of  himself  made  by
Westbrook  as  an  egalitarian  democrat  in  the  first  instance.  Unlike  Rorty,  his
temperament  and  his  engagement  in  Civil  Rights  movement,  anti-Vietnam  war
movement, etc. testimony his faith in “creative participatory democracy.” Bernstein
suggests  that  his  commitment  to  democracy  goes  back  not  only  to  Dewey’s
understanding  of  democracy  as  “primarily  an  individual  way  of  life  in  a  dialogical
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community”  (43)  but  in  a  way  also  to  his  liberal  Jewish  background.  In  his  essay,
Gregory Pappas sharply criticizes Bernstein’s recently more conciliatory stance toward
the neopragmatism of Rorty and Brandom. The desirable possibility to recollect classic
and neo-pragmatism under the same umbrella is complicated, as aforementioned, for
the radical stance of the latter against the notion of experience. Pappas sees two parties
confronting on hardly reconcilable positions so that his opinion about the possibility of
fostering  a  constructive  conversation  is  less  optimistic.  In  this  respect,  Bernstein
reaffirms  his  pragmatist  anti-dichotomist  stance.  He  agrees  with  Pappas  on  the
necessity  of  the  concept  of  experience  to  pragmatism  but  does  not  abandon  the
contention he made in The Pragmatic Turn (2010). The task of the young scholars is now
to look for  creative  ways  to  rethink and overcome theoretical  conflicts  internal  to
pragmatism. Integration, not division is the real challenge in the next future. 
4 In  the  second  section,  on  Epistemology  and  Hermeneutics,  Núria  Sara  Miras  Boronat
recovers  Bernstein’s  diagnosis  of  the  Cartesian  pathology  affecting  modern
epistemology.  In  his  masterpiece,  Beyond  Objectivism and  Relativism (1983),  Bernstein
warned  against  the  paralyzing  effects  on  philosophical  practices  of  a  dichotomist
interpretation of these terms. He uses Adorno’s metaphor of constellation and that of
conversation  as  therapy  to  the  single  approach  to  philosophical  issues  adopted  by
modern  thinkers.  The  individualistic  examination  of  traditions,  opinions,  and
prejudices  affecting  our  perspectives  is  only  apparently  dissolved in  the  “linguistic
turn”  of  the  Twentieth  Century.  The  “Cartesian  anxiety”  to  reach  foundational
certainties through solipsistic investigation risks to be merely replaced by what may be
called a “cultural solipsism” in the linguistic turn epistemology. Boronat introduces
here  her  original  argument  about  the  negative  and  positive  connotations  of  the
“ontology of community.” On the one hand, she uses Alexander’s label to criticize the
“theoretical  reification  of  a  communal  identity”  (126)  for  it  makes  impossible  to
overcome the confines of our culture. On the other, she offers positive examples of
philosophical hermeneutics’ use of this label that moves in the opposite direction. This
direction is that of a pluralistic and dynamic transformation of communities according
to Bernstein’s invitation to a philosophical pragmatic turn, and to Dewey’s precedent
claim for a creative reconstruction of democracy. Following Bernstein’s encouragement
to elaborate a “new conception of practical reason, more fallible and praxis-rooted”
(130),  Boronat’s  anti-Cartesian  strategy  is  to  put  in  conversation  theoretical
conceptions  useful  to  outline  creative,  pluralistic,  and  dynamic  reconstructions  of
democracy. In particular, she uses Wittgenstein’s conception of “form of life” to reduce
knowledge to a human practice among other human practices and to show our ease
with  the  ordinary  paradox  to  “act  exercising reason  without  possessing  ultimate
reasons”  (128).  Against  the  claim  of  traditional  epistemology,  Gadamer  denied  the
essential  identification  of  truth  and  method  (1960).  His  notion  of  “tradition”  as
something fluid and dialogical is another important notion of bearing in mind to avoid
negative reification of communities. The last theoretical tool considered is Bernstein’s
pluralism. As Boronat concludes, the lesson that Bernstein learned from pragmatism,
and also from Arendt is crucial and adds personal responsibility and commitment. An
“engaged fallibilistic pluralism” is the way to escape ideological pluralism as well as to
cope with the irreducibility of human conditions. 
5 The  issue  of  the  Cartesian  anxiety  is  also  addressed  in  Heidi  Salaverría’s  essay  on
“Critical Common Sense, Exemplary Doubting, and Reflective Judgment.” This essay is
part  of  the  third  section  of  the  book:  “Good,  Evil  and  Judgment.”  Moving  from
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Bernstein’s  claim that  uncertainty and fallibility  are respectively requirements of  a
coherent  epistemology and a  responsible  action,  Salaverría  proposes  to  investigate,
from a pragmatist perspective, the relationship between uncertainty and responsible
action.  To  this  extent,  she  shows significant  interconnections  existing  between the
three subjects mentioned in the title as elaborated by the pragmatist tradition, Hanna
Arendt, and Kant. The dynamic tension between common sense beliefs and doubting –
what Peirce called critical commonsensism – is a powerful antidote against any form of
dogmatic thinking, but leave us in the ordinary paradoxical situation of establishing
criteria for judgment within our contingent and fallible common sense view. Salaverría
explores  through  pragmatist  glasses  the  state  of  uncertainty,  “best  described  as
exemplary  doubting,”  as  investigated  by  Bernstein,  Arendt,  and  Kant.  She  aims  to
develop  the  “enabling  dimensions”  (158)  of  uncertainty  by  showing  its  profound
connection with common sense and reflective judgment. In this regard, the tension
between  action  and  contemplation  that  Bernstein  detected  in  Arendt’s  analysis  of
judgment results in an “ethical punchline” (159). Arendt’s hermeneutic interpretation
of Kant’s sensus communis is relevant, and it might have been interesting to compare her
view with Meads’s notion of “generalized other.” However, like Dewey, Arendt extends
Kant’s  aesthetic  judgment  to  other  fields  of  human  life.  Salaverría  points  out
similarities and differences of Kant’s description of reflective judgment in uncertain
situations concerning Dewey’s practical judgment and Peirce’s abduction. In particular,
she stresses the enjoyment of the uncertain situation, and the function of exemplarity of
the reflective judgment taken as a “whole situation, including the self” (163). Within
the concrete context of the sensus communis, the experience of exemplarity brings in
personal  responsibility  towards  others  as  well  as  the  connected  problem  of  the
identification  of  the  self  with  a  common  sense  view.  Bernstein’s  pragmatic
interpretation of Arendt opened the way for a closer reading of Kant’s Third Critique by
pragmatist  scholars.  Salaverría reaffirms the need to use Kant’s Third Critique,  and
Arendt’s reading of sensus communis, to deepen the enjoyable dimension of doubting as
a way to change commons sense. 
6 In his reply, Bernstein agrees with Salaverría that Kant’s Criticism of Judgment is too
often overlooked by pragmatism scholars.  As  known,  the quarrel  about  if  and how
Kantianism  is  compatible  with  pragmatism  fundamental  statements  is  a  matter  of
current debate. Their common suggestion is to look for more consistent connections in
another direction. 
7 In the fourth and last  part,  on Democratic  Vistas,  Alicia García Ruiz opens her essay
“Reconstruction of Democratic Experience” with a core question: “What does it mean
to call oneself a democrat?” (199). According to Wendy Brown, democracy is now “an
empty signifier to which one and all can attach their dreams and hopes.” This harsh
conviction is the starting point of García Ruiz’s attempt to put Bernstein and Lefort in a
dialogue. She points out three main features of Bernstein’s political view that seem to
meet  Lefort’s  view.  Democracy,  for  Bernstein,  is  “antifoundationalist,  radical  and
creative” (202). By developing these characters, García Ruiz specifies that Bernstein’s
abandonment of the quest for certainty is different from Rorty’s antifoundationalist
view of democracy. The nature of radicalism deals instead with the kind of liberalism
that a democrat should endorse. In this regard, Bernstein and Lefort’ analysis of the
contemporary connection between democracy and a degenerated form of liberalism
tackle a crucial point of current debate. At last, for Bernstein, the Deweyan aspect of
creativity claims for personal ethical engagement in democracy. Institutions are not
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divinities, and our responsibility is an unavoidable factor if we take democracy as a
praxis to endorse. 
8 The book is included in the Value Inquiry Book Series (VIBS), published by Brill Rodopi.
This series collected some titles that explore contemporary problems of  values and
valuation in their embeddedness within particular fields and contexts. The editorial
intention of the book is not merely to pay tribute to a great American philosopher.
From the passionate style of the contributors’ essays, that is conveyed by the careful
attention with which they confronted Bernstein’s works, as well as from Bernstein’s
intense  and  honest  replies,  it  is  evident  that  a  serious  philosophical  conversation
continues to advance. The typical forward-looking attitude of Bernstein on democracy
and social and political issues is in the line of Dewey. He envisioned democracy as a
“task” to accomplish in creative ways and to pursue looking at its possible future steps.
This classic American philosophical tradition finds a most convenient application in
this book. A famous title of James’s works returns to my mind. What if to consider this
book  as  Essays  in  Democracy or  Essays  in  the  Philosophy  of  Bernstein ?  According  to  a
genuine Deweyan style  –  one that  Bernstein declares  to  be  most  affectionate  to  as
having influenced his reflections since he was writing his thesis – democracy is a “life
style”  and therefore a  narrative,  social,  and dialogical  style  of  dealing with human
problems, precisely as Bernstein keeps doing in his life and work. His reflections on the
confines of social and political terms as the public sphere, the role of knowledge and
technology, the relationship between identity and community all go in the direction of
anti-dichotomist pragmatism approach. As shown in this book, his lifelong efforts to
bridge  different  continents  of  tradition,  with  a  critical  look,  encourage  younger
scholars to walk his ways in favor of always more concrete, engaged, and passionate
confrontation with different contextual aspects of the human life from an unavoidable,
and fallible, pluralism of perspectives.
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